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Is the ‘harm principle’, famously propounded by J.S. Mill and widely adopted in bioethics, an appropriate
principle to guide public health regulation? The harm principle limits liberty-limiting interventions to
those instances where the person poses a signiﬁcant risk of harm to others. However, much of public
health regulation is not primarily directed to avert risk to others, but to safeguard the health and safety of
the individual him- or herself. Regulations regarding seatbelts, motorcycle helmets and the ﬂuoridation
of water are examples of pervasive public health regulations that are primarily intended to safeguard the
individual’s own health or safety. Even laws designed to reduce smoking are justiﬁed, at least in
substantial part, by the reduction of risk to the smoker. Certainly, scholars argue that there are ‘otherregarding’ aspects to these types of laws, but there is little doubt that there are strong paternalistic
features to these, and many other public health laws, such as bans on trans fat in foods. This article
directly and forcefully questions the Millian principle, making the case for hard paternalism. When seen
from a population-based perspective that counts the number of lives saved, paternalism becomes
a plausible justiﬁcation for interventions that do not pose a truly signiﬁcant burden on individual liberty,
but go a long way towards safeguarding the health and well-being of the populace.
Ó 2009 The Royal Society for Public Health. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
John Stuart Mill’s theory of liberty is often invoked to limit state
power to cases where individuals pose demonstrable harm to
others. Few object to state regulation to deter or punish such
externally imposed harms. Traditional public health activities of
communicable disease control, for example, have deep historical
roots and strong public support precisely because state intervention is designed to control risk. The citizenry may keenly debate the
necessity of vaccination, treatment or quarantine in particular
cases, but does not question the legitimacy of government efforts to
control infectious diseases.
However, it follows from Mill’s harm principle that the state
should not exercise power to prevent or ameliorate harms that
individuals inﬂict on themselves. Mill’s central project was antagonistic to paternalism – the protection of competent adults irrespective of their expressed desires – because it is ‘better for them’.
Mill opposed regulation of ‘self-regarding’ behaviour, which affects
only or at least primarily the person concerned.1 However, some
modern liberals disagree with the inﬂexibility of Mill’s harm principle.2 Mill’s view on paternalism still resonates in Western political
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culture, even if highly regarded philosophers such as Joel Feinberg,3
Gerald Dworkin4 and John Gray5 have clariﬁed the nature of Millian
paternalism.6
On Mill’s account of liberty, classical public health regulation
would be out of bounds, including mandatory motorcycle helmet
and seatbelt laws, gambling prohibitions, criminalization of recreational drugs, and ﬂuoridation of drinking water. Taxes on
unhealthy products such as cigarettes or alcoholic beverages also
have a paternalistic quality because they create marked disincentives for self-regarding behaviour. Even professional licensing and
Food and Drug Administration drug approvals prevent consumers
from purchasing products and services when they are informed
about the risks and willingly assume them. In addition, of course,
there are ﬁerce contemporary debates about the state monitoring
and regulating what people eat; government strategies to reduce
obesity can include highly contested paternalistic policies ranging
from diabetes surveillance to tort liability, a ‘fat tax’ and a ban on
trans fatty acids.7
In this article, ‘paternalism’ indicates ‘strong’ or ‘hard’ paternalism, as deﬁned by Feinberg, where interventions are intended to
beneﬁt a person whose choices and actions are voluntary and
autonomous.3 In the authors’ view, ‘weak’ or ‘soft’ paternalism
(where individual decisions are non-voluntary or temporary
intervention is necessary to establish whether they are voluntary)
is so uncontroversial that it needs no particular defence. Such forms
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of paternalism have deep historical and jurisprudential support
under the ancient doctrine of parens patriae.9
The authors’ claim is that the political community should at
least be open to the idea of paternalism to prevent or ameliorate
harms in the population. If the collective beneﬁts are high and the
individual burdens are low, the rhetorical assertion that a policy is
paternalistic should not operate as a political trump. Public health
paternalism that markedly improves health and well-being within
the population offers a ‘broader freedom’. This term is used
advisedly to mean that when people have better opportunities for
health and longevity, and live in more vibrant, productive
communities, they have enhanced prospects for life and a wider
range of choices for now and into the future.
It will ﬁrst be helpful to describe Mill’s account of liberty and
those who see Mill’s liberty in more expansive terms, such as
Joseph Raz. Next, traditional, well-rehearsed arguments for
paternalism will be explored, which really are not defences of
paternalism at all: the external economic and social costs of selfregarding behaviour. Traditional arguments similarly focus on an
individual’s limited capacity and willpower, which again are not
true defences of paternalism. Finally, and most importantly,
another way to view public health paternalism is offered, through
the perspectives of populations and social justice. This is not
a systematic theory of justice but, much more modestly, an
explanation of why viewing paternalism from an individualistic
perspective, wholly devoid from an individual’s place in a wider
society, is misplaced.
When government policy is seen from the vantage point of
populations, rather than individuals, the emphasis is not so much
on what any particular person may, or may not, do (or want).
Instead, public policy is concerned with the overall effect of innumerable individual decisions on health and well-being in society.
Put another way, the consequence of government passivity in the
face of demonstrable harm to the public is signiﬁcant morbidity
and premature mortality, increased socio-economic disparities and
impoverished cultures that eschew social solidarity, shared
responsibility and a sense of community.
Put very simply, liberalism rejects paternalistic interventions,
and its explanation is sharply individualistic: autonomous persons
know best about their interests and preferences and no one can
compel them to perform, or refrain from performing, an act that
affects only themselves. Paternalists make the mistake of engaging
liberals on their own terms, using some variation of this type of
argument: persons do not always know what is in their best
interests due to internal (e.g. lack of understanding or willpower) or
external (e.g. insufﬁcient information) limitations, or simply
insufﬁcient attention to long-term, over short-term, needs.
Scholars talk of implied, or future consent, contract theory, and the
like, to suggest that individuals really want to be forced to do what
is good for them. This is ultimately a losing argument.
Both sides of this debate – liberal and illiberal – focus on the
individual’s wants, needs and capacities. Framing the argument this
way is sure to make it difﬁcult to contest the basic premises of
liberalism, and perhaps it is for this reason that, as Feinberg states,
paternalism is a derogatory word: ‘Paternalism is something we
often accuse people of. It suggests the view that the state stands to
its citizens as a parent (or perhaps a male parent!) stands to his
children.This sounds so outrageous that we would expect hardly
anyone to confess to paternalistic tendencies.3 And this critique
continues to have political bite, with public health paternalism
colloquially known as ‘the nanny state’.
But suppose a different type of question was asked; one in which
the focus is on the aggregate effects on the population, rather than
the individual: what type of society is beneﬁcent and just, and what
public policies would vastly reduce disease, disability and
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premature death? There is no need to ask each individual this
question, nor would one individual be allowed to stand in the way
of this greater good. Rather, it might be concluded that government
has a responsibility to pursue such policies, so long as there is
sufﬁcient evidence that the intervention would achieve these
public goods, and the burden on any individual was reasonable
compared with the beneﬁts. That is public health paternalism, or
a ‘broader freedom’, properly conceived.
J.S. Mill’s conception of liberty
J.S. Mill’s theory of liberty takes the individual as the unit of
measure for determining the utility of social policies. Individuals
are self-interested and most informed about their own needs and
value systems.11,c Other individuals, and society itself, have no
better conception – and thus no special privilege to dictate – how
a person should think or behave. Society, therefore, should give
individuals the widest possible berth by conducting ‘experiments
of living’.1 The state, the argument continues, should only regulate
actions that directly cause, or have a very high probability of
causing, unacceptable harm to others. This is Mill’s harm principle;
in his view, this allows for the maximum amount of autonomy in
the maximum number of instances by limiting society’s interference with individuals’ speech, choice and action.
Mill is not simply saying that individuals make wiser decisions
by taking their own value systems into account. Rather, he ﬁnds
intrinsic value in permitting an individual to decide for himself
even if, objectively, he makes the ‘unhealthy’ choice. It is for this
reason that liberal scholars maintain, ‘as long as individuals
understand the hazards involved, they should be free to engage in
[any] risky activity that provides them with personal satisfaction’.12
Mill’s harm principle has the admirable merit of assuring the
widest sphere of freedom. Yet, in an age of myriad risk that individuals and societies face, his claim that the state should provide
citizens with the greatest possible leeway is unsatisfying and
provides an incomplete foundation for erecting a theory of liberty.
Other political philosophers such as Joseph Raz offer a more
expansive conception of individual liberty.13 For Raz, autonomy
does not require that individuals be able to choose any option, but
only ‘an adequate range of options’. In his view, paternalistic
regulations are acceptable, even required, if they ultimately
enhance autonomy by, for example, preventing the use of
damaging narcotics that diminish a person’s decision-making
capacity. His view of ‘positive liberty’ and interpretation of the
harm principle is emblematic; harm should encompass harm to self
as well as others, which diminishes the possibilities open to individuals, thus undermining autonomy. He argues that the harm
principle should not restrain the ‘pursuit of moral goals by the
state’, but should indicate ‘the right way in which the state could
promote the well-being of people’.
Raz’s conception of liberty both narrows and broadens Mill’s
theory. Raz argues that harm only includes damage to personal
autonomy, which is narrowing in that the state can intervene only
to protect and promote self-sovereignty. However, the extension of
the harm principle to harming one’s self broadens Mill’s theory, for
it suggests that, at times, the state can (and should) intervene in the
personal sphere of individual choice and action. Raz’s harm principle is thus designed to advance the positive liberty of enhancing
autonomy and therefore promoting the good life.

c
Ian Kennedy’s deﬁnition exposes the problematic assumptions of paternalism:
‘Decisions concerning a particular person’s fate are better made for him than by
him, because others wiser than he are more keenly aware of his best interests than
he can be.’11
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Raz’s expansion of Mill’s harm principle is helpful to this project
in that it is reasonable to argue that a certain level of health is
a necessary condition for self-sovereignty. Debilitating illness or
disability can be just as harmful to the exercise of freedom as the
addictive effects of narcotics. However, this does not enable one to
claim that paternalism is justiﬁed, not simply for enhancement of
personal autonomy, but for its desirable effects on populations and
societies. Before making these arguments, based on population and
social justice perspectives, it will be helpful to explore more
traditional arguments, which, as highlighted above, are probably
not defences of paternalism at all, but do underscore some of the
vulnerabilities of Mill’s central claims.
Mill, in effect, uses a series of simplifying assumptions. Provided
the reader accepts each of them, his argument is nearly unassailable. However, when one recognizes that these assumptions are far
from simple or true, then it requires further thinking about Mill’s
claims. Here are some of Mill’s basic assumptions, each of which
presents a false dichotomy:
 individuals either have free will and full autonomy or lack
capacity;
 individual behaviour is either self-regarding or other
regarding;
 expressions are either true or false; and
 state passivity is liberty enhancing and state action is liberty
limiting.
It will be clear from the following discussion that none of these
assumptions are self-evidently correct.
Social and economic costs
Thinking and speaking in terms of ‘the right to take risks’ ignores
the fact that it is a rare driver, passenger or biker (or smoker) who
does not have a child, a spouse or a parent. It glosses over the likelihood that if the rights-bearer comes to grief, the cost of his medical
treatment, rehabilitation or long-term care will be spread among
many others. The independent individualist, helmetless and free on
the open road, becomes the most dependent of individuals in the
spinal injury ward.14
Although regulation of self-regarding behaviour is pervasive in
law and widely judicially sanctioned, few people are willing to
concede that their beliefs or actions are paternalistic; seldom will
one see a frank defence of paternalism. Instead, scholars, practitioners and judges usually justify regulation of self-regarding
behaviour as if the real reason were protection against harm to
others. After all, harm to others, or in economic terms ‘negative
externalities’,15,d can be found in almost any activity.16 Commentators support the regulation of classically self-regarding behaviours
by emphasizing the aggregate consequences for society’s health
and economic resources. Common sense suggests that bans on
smoking in public places are intended to discourage tobacco use,
but they are usually justiﬁed by the risks of side-stream smoke.17
The same can be said of helmet or seatbelt laws where the
unprotected motorist is said to present a trafﬁc hazard18 or pose an
economic burden (e.g. urgent care costs and government

d
A negative externality is a ‘spillover’ harm that extends outside the market and
affects third parties. For example, activities that transmit an infectious disease have
negative externalities. The burdens of behaviour posing a risk of disease transmission are borne by other speciﬁc individuals (close contacts or sexual partners) or
by the population at large, but without the beneﬁts of the behaviour. Individuals
infected with a contagious disease have diminished incentives to reduce risk
behaviours because the burdens of the unsafe activity do not affect them directly,
but fall primarily on others.

expenditures under Medicaid).19 Consider one court’s view of
motorcycle helmet laws:
‘From the moment of the [motorcycle] injury, society picks the
person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and
municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the
injury causes permanent disability, may assume the responsibility
for his and his family’s continued subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only he
himself is concerned.’20
It is particularly fashionable to employ economic arguments in
response to claims that government policy is paternalistic. The
‘economic burdens’ argument is unsatisfying because it asserts that
the primary justiﬁcation for public health regulation is cost savings
rather than avoidance of human suffering and disability. It is also
vague and subject to limitless exceptions.6 Whenever an individual
engages in activities that risk injury or disease, there are bound to
be economic costs that are not internalized. So, if indirect or
secondary harms were an adequate defence of paternalism, this
would swallow up Mill’s harm principle.
Consider the contemporary debates over obesity regulation
such as a ban on trans fat. Obesity-attributable medical expenditures reached $75 billion in 2003, with substantial additional
indirect costs in lost productivity.22 The costs of obesity, moreover,
are increasing rapidly.23 Critics of state regulation argue that individuals absorb the cost of their own illness, so there is no ‘public’
issue at play.24 However, taxpayers ﬁnance about half of all medical
costs through Medicare and Medicaid, and employers cover most of
the rest. Does the government have a legitimate interest in
controlling medical and social costs of individuals’ unhealthy
behaviours that are borne by society at large?25 Probably yes, but
cost alone may not be a sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for over-riding
personal liberty.
The truth is that these types of explanation for regulation of selfregarding behaviour fail to confront the real issue of paternalism.
They reduce the justiﬁcation to a strained conception of social
harms rather than recognizing certain public health interventions
as justiﬁed paternalism.26 Too often, paternalism is not evaluated
candidly in scholarly and judicial discourse. Rather, it is masked by
a legal ﬁction that the real reason is control of ‘other-regarding’
behaviour. Yet the principal reason that society requires conformance with an array of health and safety standards is to protect the
person himself.
Limited capacity, information and willpower
Another defence of paternalism holds that people face
constraints (both internal and external) on the capacity to pursue
their own interests.4,28,e,f As personal behaviour is heavily inﬂuenced and not simply a matter of free will, it is argued, state
regulation is sometimes necessary to protect the individual’s health
or safety. Individuals have to make decisions despite cognitive
limitations. There are a myriad of decisions that people make in
their lives that inﬂuence their health, ranging from the foods,
beverages, and drugs they consume to their daily activities and
habits. Most people cannot begin to assess the levels of harm or risk

e
Dworkin offers the philosophical perspective: ‘We are all aware of our irrational
propensities, deﬁciencies in cognitive and emotional capacities, and avoidable and
unavoidable ignorance, lack of will-power, and psychological and sociological
pressures.’
f
The discipline of law and economics offers the perspective that individual
capacity to pursue utility is constrained by ‘bounded rationality’, ‘bounded willpower’ and ‘bounded self-interest’.
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in their decisions, nor can they process complex scientiﬁc information to arrive at an informed choice.
People also face informational deﬁcits; decision-making
without full and accurate information about the risks. The public is
bombarded with information and it is hard to tell which is true,
which is false and which is merely exaggerated. Foods are sold
without clarity about the nutritional content or harmful effects.
Labels on packaged foods are often obfuscatory by design with
respect to serving size, percentage of ingredients and inaccurate
weights29; restaurants usually make no disclosures at all30; and
many consumers are not even aware of the risks from added
sodium, fat and sugar in highly processed foods. Some information
is simply obscure and not widely appreciated, such as the risk of
severe injury to a child from front-seat air bags or to families from
radon in the home. Even when information is available, consumers
may misapprehend the risks. Media discussions of a ‘good diet’ or
the health effects of vigorous exercise are, at best, contradictory and
confusing. Some information is provided precisely to persuade
consumers to make unhealthy decisions such as advertisements
about tobacco, alcoholic beverages or fast food.
In addition to cognitive and informational constraints, individuals have limited willpower to defer immediate gratiﬁcation for
longer-term health beneﬁts; a point often reinforced in psychobehavioural studies.31 People may objectively know what is in their
best interests but ﬁnd it difﬁcult to act accordingly. They struggle
with their immediate cravings and fail to safeguard their longerterm interests. This point is obvious in the case of physical and
psychological dependencies on illicit drugs, alcoholic beverages,
tranquilizers or nicotine, as Raz points out.13 However, individuals
may have difﬁculty controlling many behaviours that are not
conventionally regarded as addictive. A person understands that
high-fat foods or a sedentary lifestyle will cause adverse health
effects, or that excessive spending or gambling will cause ﬁnancial
hardship, but it is not always easy to refrain. The activities themselves may be so enjoyable in the short term that long-term
consequences are insufﬁciently considered.
Finally, individuals face social and cultural constraints on their
behaviour. Human behaviour is inﬂuenced by many external factors
including parents and family, peers and community, and media and
advertising. An adolescent’s decision about whether to use
a condom is affected not only by what he knows about sexually
transmitted infections, but also by the social meaning associated
with condoms among his peers and particularly his sexual partners.33,,g Similarly, a person’s decision about what to eat and
whether to smoke cigarettes or drink alcoholic beverages (and
what brand) is, at least in part, culturally determined. Subtle, but
ubiquitous, cultural inﬂuences on risk behaviour are seen in billboards and the media, in corporate logos and advertising, in the
utterances of celebrities and government ofﬁcials, and in norminﬂuencing laws and regulations.
State paternalism has the power to alter the culture in a positive
direction, making it easier for individuals to make healthier or safer
choices. Bans on smoking in public places, for example, have
contributed to a shift in social norms about tobacco.34,35 Proposals
to alter the built environment to address the obesity epidemic are
acutely discussed, such as bans on fast food restaurants, green
spaces, and bicycle or walking paths.36 The goal is to make healthy

g
There are at least two possible social meanings in condom use. First, imagine
a world where condom use is the exception such that asking another to use it
signals the belief that there is a special reason to use a condom and interrupt sex.
Second, imagine a world where people ordinarily use condoms and where an
ordinary part of sex is the use of a condom.
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foods and exercise an easier choice for individuals, particularly
those living in poor neighbourhoods.37,38
Taken together, arguments about limited capacity, information
and willpower have force, particularly on matters of health. Goodin
(1989) provides a good account of these arguments for paternalism
in the context of tobacco control.39 Individuals may be given
unfettered freedom to smoke cigarettes, take narcotic drugs, drink
and gamble to excess, or eat artery-clogging foods. However, the
consequences of satisfying all these needs for immediate gratiﬁcation are longer-term detriments to health. When a person
becomes seriously ill or disabled, the adverse effects on his or her
autonomy, let alone full enjoyment of life, are palpable. This does
not even take into account the losses that accrue to society when
countless people develop preventable injuries and diseases due to
their own activities. Thus, some limits on behaviour now may result
in greater liberty and happiness for years or decades to come,
affording a wider freedom.
These arguments based on insufﬁcient capacity, information or
willpower get at something important about human behaviour and
help explain why paternalism can sometimes be justiﬁed. However
adults, even with limitations, still have decision-making capacity,
can act knowing that their judgements are ﬂawed, and can take
responsibility for their own actions. Regulation to protect people
against their own temptations is explicitly paternalistic, and does
not overcome prevailing cultural and political concerns. There is
another way to frame the political and moral question of justiﬁed
paternalism. Rather than taking the individual as a measure of
utility, as in Mill’s theory (Mill wanted his theory to be applicable to
as many people as possible), public health paternalism is best
understood from a population-based perspective. Here, utility is
not measured by enhancing short-term individual preferences, but
by maximizing overall societal welfare; savings in pain, disability
and life within the populace.
A population-based perspective on paternalism
Perhaps it is not even accurate to think of public health paternalism as directed at the individual at all, but instead directed
towards overall societal welfare. Dan Beauchamp notes that public
health practices are ‘communal in nature, and concerned with the
well-being of the community as a whole and not just the well-being of
any particular person’.40 Policy, and here public health paternalism,
operates at the level of practices and not at the level of individual
behavior. Public health aims its policies towards the community
and counts its results in improved health and longevity in the
population.
Public health paternalism is concerned primarily with overall
societal welfare rather than individual preferences. It is intended to
beneﬁt the community as a whole rather than any given person. It
purports to save statistical, rather than individual, lives.41 Its goal is
not to affect personal choices, but to build a healthier population.
Government’s responsibility is to the collective, as well as the
individual, so it may be just as important to safeguard the population from chronic disease as infectious disease.
Even if conduct is primarily self-regarding, the aggregate effects
of persons choosing to smoke, abuse alcohol or drugs, or live an
unhealthy lifestyle can be thousands of preventable injuries and
deaths.42 Poor diet and physical inactivity alone cause 320,000 to
400,000 deaths per year. Smoking tobacco causes even higher
levels of premature death.43,44 Paternalistic laws can reduce
preventable deaths. For example, more than 4000 Americans died
on motorcycles in 2004; an increase of more than 85% from 1997.
Reduced helmet use, due to repeal or relaxation of many state
helmet laws, is the primary factor in the rising death rates.45 There
is little doubt that if society could be structured in ways that make it
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even slightly easier for individuals to make healthier choices, it
would result in greater societal well-being and productivity. Thus,
while risk to self is often the least politically acceptable reason for
regulation, it is nonetheless clear that paternalistic policies can be
effective in preventing injuries and deaths in the population.
The population perspective recognizes that public health
activities are designed to beneﬁt all or most of the population
without any speciﬁc beneﬁt to individuals. Public health theory
stresses a shared bond among members; organized society safeguards the common goods of health, welfare and security, while
members subordinate themselves to the welfare of the community
as a whole.46 Admittedly, a person of means and education may be
able to procure many of the necessities of life and choose to behave
in ways that are health enhancing. However, if that individual lives
in a community characterized by excess disease and death, with
marked inequalities, it simply is not worth privileging the wealthy
few at the expense of the many.
Perhaps there is no way to honestly frame obesity regulation to
overcome the objection that it is paternalistic, and all one can do is
argue that there remains a role for benign paternalism in the
modern state. If state measures are, in the words of Hermann Biggs,
‘plainly designed for the public good’, then the polity should at least
consider them.47 If paternalistic measures reduce illness and
premature death signiﬁcantly with minimal burdens on individual
freedom, should they be out of bounds simply because they fail to
meet a philosophical standard of self-sovereignty? Should a caring
society refuse to act when its members suffer such high burdens of
preventable disease? If so, public health agencies would become
powerless to respond effectively to the most common causes of
disability and death; personal lifestyle choices.48
A social justice perspective on paternalism
There is another way to view the problem of paternalism, which
offers a justiﬁcation for government intervention related to the
population perspective.49 The social justice perspective recognizes
that there are basic health protections which are fair, and which are
in everyone’s interest to take together.50 Racial minorities and the
poor suffer substantial disproportionate burdens from injury and
disease. Poor diet, sedentary lifestyles, smoking and substance
abuse are undoubtedly a contributing cause of socio-economic
disparities in health.51 Government passivity, leaving individuals
free to make unfettered choices, will almost certainly perpetuate
health disparities. A social justice perspective requires the state to
identify and ameliorate the common causes of disease and
premature death among the most deprived.52,53 It supports
systematic action to redress persistent patterns of disadvantage,
even if ill health is attributable to personal lifestyles.54
The most disadvantaged do not have even remotely the same
chances for living a healthy life that are afforded to more prosperous
people. They are bombarded with commercial messages about
unhealthy products; their communities are inundated with stores
selling fast food, tobacco, alcoholic beverages and ﬁrearms; their
neighbourhoods do not have playgrounds and ﬁelds for recreation;
and they live in poorly lit, violent areas that discourage outside
activity. The poor cannot afford the whole foods, health clubs and
leisure time that make it so much easier for the prosperous to live
a healthy lifestyle. A central tenet of social justice is the obligation to
help give everyone a fair chance to live a healthier life.
Health as social utility
It is commonly observed that Mill rarely expressed his hallmark
idea of social utility when it came to paternalism.4,56 Mill was
categorical in his opposition to paternalism without weighing

beneﬁts and burdens. However, affording the population a greater
measure of health and well-being has enormously positive consequences. Health is foundationally important because of its intrinsic
value and singular contribution to human functioning. Health has
a special meaning and importance to individuals and the community as a whole.57 Every person understands, at least intuitively,
why health is vital to well-being. Health is necessary for much of
the joy, creativity and productivity that a person derives from life.
Individuals with physical and mental health recreate, socialize,
work and engage in family and social activities that bring meaning
and happiness to their lives.
Perhaps not as obvious, however, health is also essential for the
functioning of populations. Without minimum levels of health,
people cannot fully engage in social interactions, participate in the
political process, exercise rights of citizenship, generate wealth,
create art and provide for the common security. A safe and healthy
population builds strong roots for a country’s governmental
structures, social organizations, cultural endowment, economic
prosperity and national defence. Population health becomes
a transcendent value because a certain level of human functioning
is a prerequisite for engaging in activities that are critical to the
public’s welfare: social, political and economic.
Health has an intrinsic and instrumental value for individuals,
communities and nations. People aspire to achieve health because
of its importance to a satisfying life, communities promote the
health of their neighbours for the mutual beneﬁts of social interactions, and nations build healthcare and public health infrastructures to cultivate a decent and prosperous civilization.

Antipaternalism: self-sovereignty, personal responsibility
and efﬁciency
If Mill’s defence of paternalism is not based purely on utility,
then perhaps it relies on the normative value that each person
should have dominion over his or her life. Individuals, according to
Mill, should not be forced to behave contrary to their better
judgements, but should be able to determine their own good.
Ethicists continue to defend antipaternalism by appeals to principles of respect for autonomy, privacy and the imperative of treating
people as moral equals.58 Along the same lines, government ought
not to distrust its citizens. Mill’s is an argument about fallibility,
that no state ofﬁcial is in a better position to determine personal
good than the individual him- or herself.
Mill’s argument assumes that what is ‘good’ is inherently
subjective, but public health is positivistic and objective. It seeks
answers based on science and the scientiﬁc method. Science, of
course, is also fallible. It cannot tell an individual which beneﬁt is
more important: health or another good (e.g. immediate gratiﬁcation from a cigarette, a drink or an exhilarating ride without
a motorcycle helmet versus long-term health and safety). However,
it may be the best way to arrive at the ‘right’ answer about health
and safety because it is the only generally recognized method that
objectively evaluates health behaviours and interventions.
This still leaves open the question about the appropriateness of
paternalism. Seen from an individual’s perspective, it is hard to
refute Mill’s argument that there are ‘good reasons for remonstrating
with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him,
but not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil in case he do
otherwise’.1 However, seen from the population perspective,
moving the activities of millions of people in the direction of
behaviours guided by rigorous science will almost certainly
improve overall health. A population that smokes less, drinks in
moderation, eats well and exercises will have improved health and
longevity.
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It is also helpful to view paternalism from the state’s perspective, and its role of acting on behalf of the population. Most people
understand that government has a duty to promote the well-being
of its citizens.59 In addition, there are certain goods that can only be
achieved through collective state action and which individuals
acting alone cannot attain. This is self-evident in the case of
infectious disease control, occupational health and product safety,
which clearly require state action. However, it can also be true for
state paternalism. If it is simply more difﬁcult to choose the healthy
option (whether it is healthy food, exercise or some other beneﬁcial
activity), then only the government can make the choice easier. It
may mean altering the informational, built or socio-economic
environment, which is beyond the ability of any single individual or
group.
Consider obesity regulation as an example. Currently, the
market makes it very difﬁcult to choose healthy foods and adequate
exercise because those options are less comprehensible, available
and affordable. However, if government used its power to change
the environment, it could have potent effects for everyone. The
state could educate and limit misleading advertising to make
choices more understandable, tax and spend to make nutritious
foods more affordable, and regulate fast food and recreational
facilities in schools, workplaces and neighbourhoods to make
healthy products and activities more accessible. Highly educated
individuals of means could probably do much of this on their own,
but for the vast majority of the population, the state can legitimately make it easier to make the beneﬁcial choice. On this view,
the state has the obligation to provide the best level of health for
the population, and it is particularly obliged to act when individuals
cannot realistically attain these goods on their own.
Sometimes hidden beneath the claims of antipaternalists (and
sometimes not so hidden) are arguments about morality and fault.
Those who choose an unhealthy or risky path are deemed
‘responsible’ or ‘at fault’ for their own condition, and unworthy of
state assistance or protection. These antipaternalists, of course,
want individuals to ‘internalize’ all the consequences of their
immoral behaviour, such as by paying for medical and social costs.
Apart from being somewhat callous and indifferent to human
happiness, ‘fault’ is a notoriously inexact concept. Fault assumes
ﬁrst that individual choices are all a matter of free will and not
conditioned on an individual’s social, cultural and economic
circumstances. It also assumes that certain behaviours are ‘good’
and others ‘bad’. However, all people engage in multiple, complex
behaviour patterns. Some socio-economic classes harm themselves
by eating fast foods, smoking cigarettes and ingesting illicit drugs.
Other classes do so by eating crème brûlée, driving fast cars,
skydiving and ﬂying private aeroplanes. Questions of fault are
malleable and socially constructed.
Finally, antipaternalists simply point out that public health
regulation of self-regarding behaviours is simply ineffective and
inefﬁcient. Lifestyle choices are ubiquitous, deeply rooted and
a central element of human existence: what one eats, drinks,
smokes and the activities of daily life. ‘To oversee these decisions
would require a larger bureaucracy than anyone has yet conceived
and methods of surveillance bigger than big brother.’60
Thus, there remains a strong consequential argument about
whether government interventions would, in fact, reduce injury,
disease and premature death and, if so, what interventions would
work best. Many of the strongest critiques of paternalistic state
action suggest that it does not work and would provoke a popular
backlash against heavy-handed governmental interference.
Centralized solutions will fail, they argue, because they cannot
take account of the wide variation in circumstances among individuals, ranging from differences in genetics to environmental
factors.24
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Even if interventions are effective, it is argued that they are
inefﬁcient. Those who support market solutions to social ills
believe that free enterprise, consumer autonomy and unfettered
individual decision making are much more likely to achieve
desirable goals, taking into account not just health but also
prosperity.
The idea that centralized solutions cannot work due to individual differences misses the point of the public health sciences.
The core understanding of epidemiology is captured in Geoffrey
Rose’s prevention paradox: a prevention measure, which brings
much beneﬁt to the population, will not beneﬁt each participating
individual.61 For example, tiny changes in the eating and exercise
habits by millions of people may have little effect on any given
person, but would have enormous beneﬁts for overall population
health, precisely because excess weight is such a prevalent cause of
chronic disease. The same could be said about seatbelts, which, in
truth, rarely beneﬁt any given individual, but the collective beneﬁts
of seatbelt laws are thousands of lives saved each year. The
prevention paradox, in turn, creates a sociopolitical problem
because individuals are less likely to accept and support interventions that offer them little personal advantage. This is particularly
true if individuals believe they have the right to make ill advised, or
beneﬁcial, decisions on their own without the state meddling in
their personal lives.
The pro-market point about the need for evidence to support
public health paternalism is undoubtedly correct. For each
proposed intervention, public health professionals must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success. Also, of course, marketbased claims also need empirical support. It is all too easy for
economic conservatives to insist that public health ofﬁcials
demonstrate positive beneﬁts. Conservatives are not tolerant of
interventions taken under conditions of scientiﬁc uncertainty, but
they rarely offer rigorous evidence that markets do better in
creating overall well-being for society. For both sides (those
favouring regulation and those favouring markets), it is insufﬁcient
to express their preferences (either pro- or antipaternalistic)
without evidence.
What type of paternalism?
It has been argued that most modern defences of paternalism
are not really defences at all, but strained attempts to frame
paternalism as coming within the harm principle. There are, in
addition, scholars who defend ‘weak’ forms of paternalism; not in
Feinberg’s sense of involuntary action, but simply in the sense that
the intervention is not ‘too’ coercive.62–64 The problem with arguments for this type of ‘weak’ paternalism is that they fail to meet
Mill’s critique, and lack clarity or consistency. Defenders of weak
paternalism rarely deﬁne it, or separate it logically from ‘hard’
paternalism; it is more a matter of degree of coercion rather than
the nature of coercion itself. Instead, weak paternalism is explained
through illustration of historically accepted, low-level forms of
coercion such as taxation on alcohol and tobacco, restrictions on
illicit drugs, smoking bans in public places, and health education or
mild advertising restrictions.
Arguments for paternalism (weak or strong) need to be made on
a case-by-case basis. What is the seriousness of the harm to be
avoided? How likely is the intervention to be effective in reducing
the harm? What opportunity costs are incurred by the state’s
decision to act or not to act? What level of burden is imposed on the
individual or business in exchange for the collective good to be
achieved? There are some public harms that are so pervasive, and
which can be ameliorated without unreasonable burdens, that
society should confront the question of whether they are justiﬁed.
Simply to say that the interventions are unwarranted because the
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harm is self-inﬂicted does not do justice to the claim that there are
profound effects on the population, particularly the poor.

healthily and avoid trans fats, but who nonetheless rode his bicycle
on his 90th birthday.

Conclusion: the utility of freedom or of health

Ethical approval

Government can give people the information, legislate and
regulate to encourage sustainable living, and help business to
function in a more environmentally responsible way but it cannot
‘do it’ by itself. ‘Doing it’ will depend on the decisions and choices of
millions of individuals and companies. Our task is to empower
them to make the right decisions and choices. Government has to
encourage and inform; if necessary, in a tougher way than ever
before. Our public health problems are not, strictly speaking, public
health questions at all. They are questions of individual lifestyle:
obesity, smoking, alcohol abuse, diabetes and sexually transmitted
disease. These are not epidemics in the epidemiological sense. They
are the result of millions of individual decisions at millions of points
in time. These individual actions lead to collective costs. The
question still hangs in the air: whose responsibility is it? The
individual? The state? The company? Should it be a proper area for
government intervention at all?
Mill’s principle of liberty purports to be instrumental. It is put in
place to promote personal autonomy, which Mill believes transforms society in a way that promotes utility (i.e. happiness).65
However, if utility is the purpose, what are the instrumental effects
of social policies that champion selﬁsh individualism and the
undeterred entrepreneur? If the above argument is true, then state
passivity in the face of demonstrable harm in the population will
result in societal damage that adversely affects most members of
the community. Strict limits on paternalism predictably will result
in higher levels of illness and premature death, greater inequalities
based on race and socio-economic status, and lonely cultures
lacking in social solidarity, shared commitments and community
spirit.
Perhaps this consequential argument will never convince those
who hold the formalistic view that certain norms can never be
breached irrespective of the good to be achieved. However, suppose
a paternalistic public health intervention was effective in preventing a high consequence event such as contracting human
immunodeﬁciency virus infection or developing diabetes.1,67,68
Would a relatively small invasion of autonomy or privacy be justiﬁed considering the beneﬁts?
Thus, the utility of freedom simply may not be worth it in certain
cases; the potential disutility of particularly hazardous activities
may be immeasurably greater than the utility of exercising
autonomy in that small sphere. The Millian logic that individuals
must exercise unfettered discretion in order to be happy is
unconvincing; this logic is particularly unpersuasive when seen
from the perspective of millions of decisions, taken by millions of
individuals, leading to pervasive illness and death. It just may be
possible, counter to all prevailing liberal tradition and political
posturing, that people gain greater comfort when asked to forego
a little bit of freedom in exchange for a healthier and safer
community. In addition, it just may be possible that well-directed
paternalism promotes a ‘broader freedom’ for the many.69 One
should, therefore, remain open to the idea that the state can
sometimes validly regulate harms that are apparently self-imposed,
but which are deeply socially embedded and pervasively harmful to
the populace.
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